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Resume:  
 
This essay gives a global vision of the provision of the state of emergency in the 
constitutions from an historical, theoretical, legal, and practical perspective. The 
state of emergency is a contemporary measure broadly spread and used all 
around Europeans democracies. The objective of this work is to show how far the 
rights protected in the Constitution can be suspended in times of emergency. 
This topic stress the supremacy and the function of the Constitution, as the 
supreme norm of the legal order. The internationalization and 
constitutionalization of the emergency provisions reveals the paradigm of the 
Constitution, the coexistence of constitutional core values and international law. 
The notion, the elements and the effects of the state of emergency are studied in 
this essay through the analysis of various examples in Spain, France and Turkey. 
 
Este ensayo da una visión global de las previsiones del estado de emergencia en 
las constituciones desde una perspectiva histórica, teórica, jurídica y práctica.  El 
estado de emergencia es una medida contemporánea largamente extendida y 
utilizada a través de numerosas democracias europeas. El objetivo de este 
trabajo es mostrar en qué medida los derechos protegidos en la Constitución 
pueden estar suspendidos en tiempos de emergencia. 
Este tema pondrá de relieve la supremacía y la función de la Constitución, como 
norma suprema del ordenamiento jurídico. La internacionalización y 
constitucionalizacion de las medidas de emergencias subrayan el paradigma de 
la Constitución, que es la coexistencia de un cuerpo de valores constitucional y el 
derecho internacional. La noción, los elementos y los efectos del estado de 
emergencia están estudiados en este ensayo a través de la análisis de varios 
ejemplos en España, Francia y Turquía. 
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METHODOLOGY  
 
At the first sight I thought It will be hard to find in off information about the 
regulation of the state of emergency and It will be hard to redact sufficient amount 
of pages. But after few working sessions, I realized how large was my topic and 
how many information were available.  The hardest part was to limit my work, 
stay focus on one direction and don’t miss the objectives of my essay.  
I tried to use an important variety of resources, to make my essay as rich as 
possible. I found a lot of legal references and university books in the library of my 
own university but as well in others universities (UPF Barcelona and UT1 
Toulouse). I used different search engine, like Trobador, Dialnet etc. I have also 
been help with different article of juridical review from universities all around the 
world.  
As I am French, I was really interested by the events that happened in France in 
the last 10 years and also really confused by state of emergency there. I wanted to 
know more about it and understand its functioning and compare it with other 
system. Compare it with Spain, because it is the country where I study and I 
thought that the two legal system has a lot in common and could be easily 
compared. And a comparison with Turkey because of the last recent events and 
because it is so different context.  
I decided to write my essay in English because It was more challenging for me 
and I wanted to add an international dimension. I thought It could be an 
interesting idea to redact my essay in English in order to share it and have a 
bigger impact. As my thematic involves a lot of different international aspect and 
global problematics I found much more documents in English than in other 
languages.  
My tutor, the PhD. Nuria Saura, helped me a lot as well, through her various 
corrections, and also by reminding me to stay focus on my objectives, limiting me 
and helping me to find the structure of my work.  
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INTRODUCTION  
 
“There is more to life than simply increasing its speed.”1 
MAHATMA Gandhi 
 
        
As said, speed is not always the good answer for peace, time is also necessary to 
get out of a problematic situation. The State of emergency or state of exception 
has referred to the situation in which a state is confronted by a mortal threat and 
responds by doing things that would never be justifiable in normal times, given 
the working principles of that state. The state of exception uses justifications that 
only work in extremis, when the state is facing a challenge so severe that it must 
violate its own principles to save itself2. 
 
The topic that we are going to develop is the provisions on emergency measures 
in the Constitution. In democratic regimes, we see the Constitution as a 
fundamental norm, the norm of the norms, the one that nothing can affect. A 
Constitution is at the top of the legal order but also at the base of all the other one. 
This “super norm” is the results of history and a background of a state and its 
society. Constitution also finds its legitimacy in the popular approval required to 
be adopted. In all constitutions we can find a series of values that are considered 
the “core” of the Constitution and cannot be derogated. During time of danger for 
the safety of the nation, or when some events or elements can threaten the 
political order, the Constitution sets some measures to prevent this kind of threats. 
Those are the “emergency measures”, they allow the authorities to declare the 
State of emergency and permits a reorganization of the repartition of powers in 
order to face those security issues. Those measures can be dangerous and lead to 
                                                
1 MAHATMA Gandhi and ATTENBOROUGH Richard, The words of Gandhi, 
Newmarket Words Of Series, 2001 
2 SCHEPPELE Kim, ‘The International State of Emergency : Challenges to 
Constitutionalism after September 11,’ , Journal of Constitutional law 2006 
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authoritarian consequences because it allows a new repartition of power, 
empowering the executive. That’s why it needs to be used in the respect of the 
principle of necessity and proportionality and to be limited by a judicial review. 
The measures adopted during the state of emergency can sometimes affect some 
values and principles set in the Constitution approved by the people.  
 
The point in the essay will be to see how a Constitution can forecast emergency 
measures, measures that can affect and in some cases suspend some principles of 
the Constitution. I decided to develop the topic of the state of emergency, because 
in the last 2 decades we seemed to enter in the security era. The security is a 
priority and justify all the measures taken. However, there are still a lot of armed 
conflicts and acts of terrorism. In reaction to an external threat, the answers of 
some states seem to be to adopt emergency measures. The problem now is to 
identify when the declaration of the state of emergency is justified. The major 
threat for contemporary democracies is terrorism. However, terrorism is a 
permanent threat, this war against terrorism leads to abuses and permanent state of 
emergency. The emergency becomes the norm. We are going to see how far the 
rights protected in the Constitution can be suspended when the state integrity is 
threatening. 
 
This is the great paradox of the exceptional measures, how some aspects of the 
supreme norm and highest norm of the legal order can be suspended. In recent 
movement of internationalization of Constitution, this one must respect and 
protect a certain standard of human rights. There is multilevel protection of a 
series of non derogable rights. To make all these observations more concrete we 
are going to see some examples of state of emergency practices trough the 
presentation of the relevant practical example of Spain, France and Turkey.  
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1. THE PROVISIONS OF EMERGENCY IN SUPREME 
CONSTITUTION 
 
Analyzing the development from the ancient to the modern concept of 
constitution reveals elements which have also been brought to light in the current 
discussion on an international constitutional law: giving the community a legal 
framework and continuity guaranteed by the constitution; the constitution’s high 
authority; its function to maintain freedom; and its supremacy, but also its 
procedural character. The actual concept of constitution emerges in the modern 
age only. 3 
 
1.1.The historical idea of Constitution  
 
Before to enter in the emergency provisions issues, I thought appropriate to 
remind the basics of the construction of the Constitution and the constitutional 
ideology. 
Because the term Constitution literally means “creation or foundation”, in the 
Constitution the people create and found a government, which has no legitimate 
power apart from the people’s will expressed in the Constitution4. The 
Constitution is a document, according to which the country carries out its 
operations and also used to protect the rights of the citizens. That’s why as the 
foundation of the society it is important to present it, to understand the provisions 
of emergency measures in the Constitution.  
 
The theory of John Locke in Ensayo sobre el gobierno civil (1690)5 is based on 
the idea of the transition between a “State of nature” to a “Social state”. He 
explains through contractual analogy, that society politically organized was built 
on the acceptance of the social contract, “le contrat social”. The construction of 
this social contract was necessary to build a society able to guarantee the 
                                                
3 KLEINLEIN Thomas, Constitutionalization in International Law, Max Planck Institut, 
2012 
4 CENTER FOR CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY , The importance of democratic 
constitution, Center for Constitutional democracy, Indiana University Review, 2012 
5 LOCKE John, Dos ensayos sobre el gobierno civil, S.L.U Espasa libros, 1997 
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protection of the rights of citizens. In this struggle against the state of nature, the 
first constitutions were born as the agreement of the people during English 
revolution (1640-59). The idea of this document was to represent the power of the 
community and the importance to take decision with majority.  
 
Latter, Sieyes6, one of the first constitutional theorists, talked about the national 
sovereignty which belongs to the Nation as a social body composed by 
individuals sharing the same collective identity (with a common history, with 
common costumes …).  The National sovereignty is when political legitimation is 
turned into legal legitimation.  Rousseau7 used the concept of the popular 
sovereignty represented by the idea of the general will, the idea that the interest of 
the collective must sometimes have precedence over individual will. Rousseau’s 
central argument in The Social Contract is that government attains its right to 
exist and to govern by “the consent of the governed.” He saw the legislative 
powers as established in the people itself, because the laws in their express the 
general will. 
 
Following these ideas The Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen, in 
French, Déclaration des droits de l'homme et du citoyen of 1789 of the French 
Revolution declare that the rights of man are held to be universal: valid at all 
times and in every place, pertaining to human nature itself. It became the basis for 
a nation of free individuals protected equally by law. The new role of the 
Constitution is to set a series of rights that are guaranteed by the Constitution and 
that have to be respected in the society in order to protect the individual’s rights of 
citizens. The Constitution is used as a way to protect rights in the State and not 
only as a way to organize the repartition of power in the State. 
 
The role of a Constitution in the repartition of power in the society is governed by 
two principles: the separation of powers and the idea of the subordination of 
                                                
6 RUBINELLI Luci, How to think beyond sovereignty: On Sieyes and constituent power, 
SAGE journals, European Journal of Political Theory, 2016 
7 ROUSSEAU Jean-Jacques, Le contrat social, Collection complète des œuvres Genève, 
1762 
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power to the Law. Locke was the first one to defend the idea of the division of 
power in legislative, executive and judicial power. Montesquieu in “ l’Esprit des 
lois”8 of 1748 promote the need of checks and balance of power, for him the 
different powers should limit each other’s and It is necessary to guarantee the 
rights of the citizens. The principle of the subordination of power to the Law was 
first was first exposed in the Bill of rights 1689, It represents the necessary 
conditions to limit the absolute power, protect democracy and prevent arbitrarian 
decisions. We saw from an historical and theoretical perspective the formation of 
the ideology behind the construction of a Constitution. The constitution was 
created as a social contract to protect the rights of citizens, It represents the 
national sovereignty found in the people and organize the repartition of power in 
the society.  
 
The Austrian author Hans Kelsen published in 1934 the influent book “Pure 
Theory of Law”9. In his theory of positive law, as forming a hierarchy of laws 
which start from a basic norm (Grundnorm) where all other norms are related to 
each other by either being inferior norms, when the one is compared to the other, 
or superior norms. To observe the validity of different norms in the legal order, 
Kelsen defined a pyramid of norm, the norms of inferior rank is valid it respected 
the legal process set by its superior norm. At the top of this pyramid, we have the 
basic norm, the fundamental norm. All legal norms of a given legal system 
ultimately derive their validity from one basic norm. 
The hierarchical structure of the legal order of a State presupposes the basic norm, 
the constitution as the highest level within national law. The Constitution in the 
material sense consists of those rules which regulate the creation of the general 
legal norms. For him, the Constitution contains a lot of different norms, norms 
which are no part of the material Constitution. But it is in order to safeguard the 
norms determining the organs and the procedure of legislation that a special 
solemn document is drafted and that the changing of its rules is made especially 
difficult.  
                                                
8 MONTESQUIEU, L’esprit des lois, GF Flammarion, edition 2013  
9 KELSEN Hans, The pure theory of Law, University of California Press, 1934 
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1.2.The constitution as a fundamental norm  
 
The vast majority of contemporary constitutions describe the basic principles of 
the state, the structures and processes of government and the fundamental rights 
of citizens in a higher law that cannot be unilaterally changed by an ordinary 
legislative act.  This higher law is usually referred to as a Constitution. 
The Constitution is characterized by the principle of supremacy. This principle 
shouldn’t be mixed up with the idea of hierarchy. The supremacy refers to the 
condition of the constitution as the norm which fund and create legally the State 
and the organized political community. The supremacy exists between the 
Constitutions and the Law, in other words between the constitution and all the 
legal decisions, authorities and norms. Its supremacy is a unique characteristic and 
has 3 manifestations: 
 
• the efficacy of the Constitution: as a founding norm of the State and the 
community which compose it, which make it exist by the Law. It sets the 
process of creation of others norms in the legal system and allows the 
interpretation of the other norms.  
 
• the quality of the Constitution: it is the fundamental norm of the State.  
 
• the position of the Constitution: as the superior norm, the Constitution 
prevail on the other norms in the legal system. It has the capacity to 
impose criterion and standards that the other norms should respect and be 
conform with. It also has the aptitude to make the nullity of 
unconstitutional acts and base the invalidity of norms which contradict it.  
 
What is really relevant of the supremacy of the Constitution is its direct 
application, it can be alleged in front of all the judges. This need of direct 
applicability of the Constitution came after the World War II, when the feeling 
that the lack of recognition of the applicability of the constitutions had facilitated 
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the rise of forces against the constitutional order during the fascist and totalitarian 
regimes. The point was to reaffirm the supreme position of the Constitution to 
prevent abuses and violations of basic constitutional principles.  
 
To emphasize the primacy of the Constitution let’s introduce the German 
constitution as an example. The failure of the Weimar Republic and the 
experience of the totalitarian Nazi regime did not only induce the framers of the 
new constitution called the Basic Law to cast human rights and freedoms as 
enforceable subjective rights. They put the Basic Law10 at a special rank and 
explicitly orders that the basic rights shall bind the legislature, the executive and 
the judiciary as directly applicable law. A relevant example of this will to put the 
protection of the human dignity in the Constitution as a priority can be observed 
in the first article of the Basic Law: “Article 1(1) Human dignity shall be 
inviolable. To respect and protect it shall be the duty of all state authority. 
(2) The German people therefore acknowledge inviolable and inalienable human 
rights as the basis of every community, of peace and of justice in the world. 
(3) The following basic rights shall bind the legislature, the executive and the 
judiciary as directly applicable law.” 
 
As Dieter Grimm who, as justice serving on the German Constitutional Court 
redaction rightly said: “It was the firm consensus of all political forces active in 
the constitutional assembly to prevent another failure of representative 
democracy in Germany and to establish effective safeguards against dictatorship 
and disregard of human rights. The constitution should therefore be the 
paramount law of the land and claim priority over any government act”.11  
 
The Constitution has been built in order that the basic constitutional principles 
which structure the State such as democracy, separation of powers, the rule of law 
and respect for human dignity may not be altered at all. The aim was to prevent 
                                                
10 The basic Law for the Federal Republis of Germany,Grundgesetz für die 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Language Service of the German Bundestag,  
1949 
11.DIETER Grimm, ‘Human Rights and Judicial Review in Germany’ , Human Rights 
and Judicial Review, 1994 
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the enemies of democracy from overturning it using its own instruments, like 
majority rule. 
 
1.3. Constitutional review and the principle of the rule of law  
 
The manifestation of the supremacy of the Constitution is also the possibility of 
constitutional review. The constitutional review is the ability of judges to 
supervise the Constitution. The centralized model of constitutional review was 
born in Europe after World War I.12 Most European countries have established 
special constitutional courts. An ad hoc court that are uniquely empowered to set 
aside legislation that runs counter to their constitutions. Only the constitutional 
court is empowered to hold that a norm is constitutional or not. If it is not 
constitutional the court may invalidate the norm with general effects (effects erga 
omnes) because it contravenes the constitution. There are basically two ways used 
in order to ask for a constitutional review of legislation:  
• constitutional challenges: brought by public institutions (Parliament, 
ombudsman, government etc). 
• constitutional questions: are raised by ordinary judges, when he has to 
decide a particular case, if the judge believes that the applicable norm is 
unconstitutional or doubts its validity, he can refer the question to the 
constitutional court. The constitutional court will only answer on the 
constitutionality of the statute not on the resolution of the case itself.  
The possibility to have a judicial review included in the Constitution ( in the 
Spanish Constitution  in the Title 9 “Del tribunal constitucional”13) gives a legal 
certainty. To create a special and single court in charge of constitutional review of 
legislation is necessary to foster a legal certainty and avoid contradictions 
                                                
12 COMELLA Victor, The European model of constitutional review of legislation: 
Toward decentralization, Oxford University Press and New York University school of 
law, 2004 
13 Constitución Española de 1978, BOE núm. 311, de 29 de diciembre de 1978, Título 
IX. 
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between the courts. On that point the European model is different from the 
American one who doesn’t adopt such a centralized constitutional review.  
Judicial review give rise to a “democratic objection” because the legislation in 
question was the product of a democratic legislature. But the members of this 
special court are selected in a democratic way and has to be often renew. 
 
Legal order need stable constitutions protecting the division of power, but they 
also need constitutional flexibility to adjust to changing social and political 
conditions. Constitutional Rigidity is usually considered a necessary condition for 
“strong constitutionalism”. To ensure this normative superiority, the Constitution 
includes an amendment procedure making it impossible for parliamentary 
majorities to change the Constitution by means of the ordinary legislative 
procedure. The rigidity of the Constitution is also part of the supremacy of the 
Constitution because it reaffirms the concept of legal stability and security and 
allows its protection in front of abusive constitutional changes. 
 
Government should not be free to take any kind of decision it wants, it should be 
constrained by enduring legal principles. The rule of law has to be the ultimate 
ruler and not the government. It is a necessary principle in order to protect, to 
establish and defend enduring legal principles to limit the government. To protect 
this principle in the best way it has to be consecrate in an entrenched, written 
constitution.  
 
For democratic constitutions, the people create the Constitution, so the people 
define the exact meaning of the rule of law for their country. This popular creation 
will help protect the rule of law, much better than if the rule of law were imposed 
from above.14 The people will be more likely to be devoted to the rule of law and 
to rally to its defense if it is their own creation. A popularly adopted constitution 
will inspire more protective loyalty; because the Constitution cares for the people, 
the people will want to care for it.  
                                                
14 CENTER FOR CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY , The rule of law and 
Constitutions, Center for Constitutional democracy, Indiana University Review, 
ccd.indiana.edu/file_download/31/vruleoflaw_12.pdf, 2012 
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A good Constitution should respect the principle of checks and balances which 
means that the Constitution will divide power among various office-holders, so 
that it will be very difficult for any one person or body to dominate. As a result, if 
one person or body tries to violate the Constitution, the others will be able to push 
back.  
 
Then a good Constitution, not only defines and adopts the rule of law; it also 
provides a governmental structure to protect it. There is no universally agreed 
meaning of the rule of law, but It is admitted that in a rule of law country, the 
government must be subject to enduring legal principles, but not all the countries 
agreed about which principles. As, we saw it earlier It also depend on the 
historical, social and political background of this country, its past will define what 
will be its priorities now. 
 
The most common principles admitted are:  
• The legal regularity: Legal regularity refers to the idea that laws must be 
made in such a way that the people can know the rules that will apply to 
them and so can plan accordingly. To ensure that the people can know the 
law and plan, legal regularity requires that laws must be published, 
prospective (not applying to acts done before the law was adopted), clear  
and general (applying to all alike, both rich and poor, weak and powerful, 
etc.). 
 
• Democracy: refers to a political system in which the people govern, most 
commonly by choosing their representatives in free, fair, multiparty 
elections. But although the rule of law mandates democracy in general, it 
does not specify a particular form of democracy (presidential systems, 
parliamentary systems etc) 
 
• Individual rights: Governments may not intrude on these rights without 
extraordinary need, such as the safety of the country or the prevention of 
mass murder, it may not restrict these rights merely in the interest of 
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“public order”. The individual rights are areas of autonomy of every 
countries and establish a set of rights considered to be the most important 
to individuals as citizens. to individuals as citizens. But different countries 
will appropriately choose to protect different sets of individual rights 
according to their particular circumstances. 
 
To make the rule of law a reality, countries need a system of courts or court-like 
bodies that are independent, professionally trained, and faithful to the law. 
 
 
1.4.The constitutionalization and internationalization of emergency 
provisions  
 
The constitutionalization of emergency provisions began in revolutionary France, 
was first introduced in her 1795 constitution and took off from there to Latin 
America via the Iberian Peninsula. It is the Constitution of the Year III is the 
constitution that founded the Directory, it established that the central government 
retained great power, including emergency powers to curb freedom of the press 
and freedom of association.15 Historians of emergency constitutions such as 
Rossiter (2009)16 or Friedrich (1968)17 have stressed the differences between the 
(French) état de siège and the (British) martial law tradition. This ties in well with 
the legal origins literature that separates three civil law origins (French, German, 
and Scandinavian) from the common law tradition. 
 
Latter the majority of the countries set in their constitutions some measures of 
emergency in response to perceived crisis for the nation. The Constitution 
operates in normal times, in peacetime, and in difficult times, that is in times of 
war, times of national security crises, times of emergency is employed. This 
                                                
15 SUTHERLAND, The French Revolution and Empire: The Quest for a Civic Order, 
D.M.G 2nd edition, 2003 
16 HONIG Bonnie, Emergency Politics: Paradox, Law, Democracy, Princeton University 
Press, 2009 
17 BJORNSKOV Christian and VOIGT Stefan, The Determinants of Emergency 
Constitutions, University of Hamburg, Institute of Law and Economics, March 23 of 
2016 
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prevision of emergency measures in the national Constitution has been influenced 
by the international legal order. We understand that this prevision is thought at 
different level of legal framework (multi-level approach). At the international law 
level, the Security Council of the United Nations (UN) starts legalizing for global 
security after the Cold War. The events of the 9/11 provided the occasion for a 
new discourse of a global state of emergency, and the need for a permanent war 
on terror. The security council adopted a Resolution18 where states are ordered to 
prevent and combat terrorism, to strengthen border security and prevent the 
movement of terrorists in part by tracking migrants and refugees, and to become 
parties to the UN.'s anti-terrorism conventions and protocols. Most remarkable is 
that states are required to change their domestic laws to criminalize terrorism and 
its financing as a separate offense in national codes with harsher punishments than 
those attached to ordinary crimes. Each nation is called upon to upgrade its 
legislation and executive machinery to “fight terrorism.”  
 
Kim Scheppele19 criticizes this “global state of emergency” because this version 
of global governance undermines the domestic separation of powers in favor of 
domestic executives and greatly strengthens the executive power by attenuating 
the parliament role (setting of surveillance program, moves toward preventive 
detention and aggressive interrogation by security-minded domestic forces). But 
emergency governance is not lawless, the Council's emergency governance 
involves rule making, and legislation that is technically legal.  
 
According to the Charter20, the Security Council have the possibility to invoke the 
concept of implied powers, and the principle of effectiveness to justify the 
resolutions as the necessary exceptional response to the emergency situation 
created by transnational terrorism. In other words, the Security Council can 
suspend some Charter rules and norms, assuming plenary powers, abrogating the 
                                                
18 UN, Resolution 1373 of the Security Council of the United Nations at its 4385th 
meeting, September 2001 
19 SCHEPPELE Kim, The International State of Emergency : Challenges to 
Constitutionalism after September 11, September , Journal of Constitutional law, 2006 
20 UN, Article 29 of the United Nations Charter of 26 of June of 1945  
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rudimentary separation of powers and existing constitutional guarantees of due 
process and other human rights of suspects in the war on terror, so as to act 
effectively in the face of threats to the basic order and to restore it once the threats 
are dealt with.  
After all, the Security Council is an emergency executive, established to identify 
and respond to crises, to declare the exception and to protect international peace 
and security, on the treaty reading, and the order created by the Charter and public 
international law, on the constitutional interpretation.21 But this justification for 
deviating from existing norms would have to fit in the framework of the 
exceptional and temporary nature of police enforcement measures.  
The legislative powers deduced from the implied powers are questioned by some 
member’s states arguing that this is not a function envisaged in the Charter and 
that the Council is structurally inappropriate to legislate for the U.N. because it is 
not a representative body. 
 
 In my perspective, I am not convinced that transnational terrorism poses the kind 
of existential threat to the world order that could justify instituting a general state 
of emergency rule or the self-attribution of plenary powers on the part of the 
Security Council to legislate and institute a new form of global law. The 
constitutionalization of the Public International Law regulating the global political 
system has to be understood as the institutionalization of a new dualistic 
sovereignty regime, in which states retain their legal and political autonomy and 
constituent authority but within which the supra-national legal order of a revised 
U.N. Charter is also construed as autonomous and constrained by 
constitutionalism. The challenge here is to create a new form of global law by 
constitutionalizing the international law in a world of sovereign states with 
different characteristics and respecting their own constitutions.  
 
 
 
                                                
21 ALVAREZ Jose, International Organizations as Law Makers, Oxford Monographs in 
International Law, 2006 
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1.5. Coexistence of constitutional core values and international law	
 
The point here is to determine the coexistence of constitutional core values and 
international law. It is a really important that we are going to stress here because 
we will understand how the international law has influenced the content of the 
constitutions and how the constitutions adapted to this international provisions. To 
understand we can use the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European 
Union (CJEU) with the Kadi Case.22 The Court essentially had to decide whether 
a UN Security Council resolution should enjoy primacy over European Union 
(EU) law. The case is about Kadi, identified as a supporter of Al-Qaida and he 
was sanctioned for an assets freeze. The EU transposed this UN sanction by a 
regulation which Kadi then attacked before the EU Courts. After the examination 
of the respect from the Security Council of the ius cogens, in particular certain 
fundamental rights, the General court concluded that there was no infringement of 
this standard. The CJEU had to review the lawfulness of the EU regulation 
transposing the resolution. Its central argument was that the protection of 
fundamental rights forms part of the very foundations of the Union legal order. 
Accordingly, all Union measures must be compatible with fundamental rights. In 
the case of Kadi, the CJEU considered that detainee’s rights were not respected, 
because “had not been informed of the grounds for his inclusion in the list of 
individuals and entities subject to the sanctions. Therefore he had not been able to 
seek judicial review of these grounds, and consequently his right to be heard as 
well as his right to effective judicial review and the right to property had been 
infringed.”23  
 
The conclusions of the CJUE in Kadi case defend the autonomy of EU Law. In 
this perspective “obligations imposed by an international agreement cannot have 
the effect of prejudicing the constitutional principles of the European Community 
                                                
22 Case C–402/05 P and C–415/05, P. Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v. 
Council and Commission , on the 3rd of September of 2008 
23 KOKOTT and SOBOTTA, The Kadi Case – Constitutional Core Values and 
International Law – Finding the Balance? The European Journal of International Law, 
2012, http://www.ejil.org/pdfs/23/4/2343.pdf   [Last visited 1 May 2017] 
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Treaty”24. The choice of a somewhat dualist approach in this particular context 
has to be understood as a reaction to a specific situation that may occur in 
multilevel systems. In such systems it is possible that the level of protection of 
fundamental rights guaranteed by a higher level does not attain the level of 
protection the lower level has developed and considers indispensable.  
The insufficient protection of fundamental rights at UN level therefore required 
the adoption of a dualist conception of the interplay of EU law and international 
law25. Basically, the CJEU gives proper consideration to the measures against 
terrorism but to find a balance between constitutional core values and effective 
international measures against terrorism is not easy.  
2. THE EXCEPTIONAL STATE OF EMERGENCY 
 
After World War II, the horror of the Holocaust and the concentration camps led 
the international community to develop universal human rights, grouped under a 
solemn declaration, in order to prevent that tragedy from happening again. 
However, in the last twenty years the world has, according to Giorgio Agamben, 
witnessed a renewed emergence of violation of human rights.  
These violations are illegal, they are not completely outside the law, but they are 
permitted under the extraordinary circumstance of the “War on Terror”. The first 
decade of the new millennium can be understood as a security decade. The 
terrorist attacks of 9/11 are the symbol of the threat and the legitimation of the 
reaction of the international community to these attacks. The security challenge is 
affecting constitutional values.26What Agamben has rightly stressed is that the 
concept of a “state of exception” under which the legal order is not valid, that a lot 
of countries implicitly adopt in the fighting against terrorism, is the same behind 
the concentration camps27. Nazi Germany, in fact, did not operate in violation of 
                                                
24 Opinion of Advocate General Poiares Maduro Kadi and Al Barakaat, supra note 1, at 
para. 285, on the 3rd of September of 2008 
25 SCHEININ Martin, ‘Is the ECJ Ruling in Kadi Incompatible with International Law?’, 
Terrorism and human rights, Cheltenham, 2009 
26 Proceedings of the 4th Vienna Workshop on international Constitutional Law, 2008 
27 GIORDANENGO Davide, “The State of Exception”, E-international relations students 
review, 2016 
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the Weimar Constitution, but within the framework of its articles that allowed the 
government to suspend individual rights in case of necessity. Thus, “from a 
juridical perspective, the entire Third Reich can be considered a state of exception 
that lasted twelve years”. 28  
 
A state of emergency can lead to abuse and can be dangerous.  It threatens to turn 
the “basic democratic structures into mere appendages of an arbitrary authority” 
and creates a situation where the “temptation to disregard constitutional freedoms 
is at its zenith, while the effectiveness of traditional checks and balances is at its 
nadir.”29  There is a tragic tension “between democratic values and responses to 
emergencies”  where states have to question whether the violation of fundamental 
rights can be justified in the name of the continued existence of the democratic 
state.30 
In our essay we will discuss about the notion of state of exception as paradigm of 
government for contemporary international politics. We will center our analysis 
around an European perspective and the term “state of emergency” will be 
understood as it is defined by the European Convention on Human Rights.  
 
 
2.1. The theories around the notion of state of emergency  
 
The notion of the state of emergency is plural and could be defined differently 
according to the perspective adopted. In the following part, we will see few 
various authors debating on this notion. Historically, the state of emergency was 
intended to settle massive internal conflicts posing a threat to the state.  Today, 
many authors describe the state of emergency a legal means of fighting the 
dangers emanating from global terrorism. This definition is not so clear because 
the concept of the state of emergency is an attempt to legally explain and regulate 
                                                
28 AGAMBEN Giorgio, The State of exception, University of Chicago Press, 2005 
29 GROSS Oren , “Chaos and Rules: Should Responses to Violent Crises Always be 
Constitutional?”, Yale  Law Journal ,2003 
30 LAZAR, Nomi Claire, States Of Emergency In Liberal Democracies , Cambridge 
University Press, 2009 
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phenomenon whose main characteristic is the deregulation of legally regulated 
fields. 
 
According to the Carl Schmitt’s theory the state of emergency is the original 
source of sovereignty. 31 The author uses the term of “state of exception” called in 
german, Ausnahmezustand, as a concept in his legal theory, similar to a state of 
emergency, but based in the sovereign's ability to transcend the rule of law in the 
name of the public good.  
 
This concept is developed in Giorgio Agamben's book State of Exception of 
2005.32 Schmitt argues that attempts to legalize the exceptional situation are 
doomed to failure. It is impossible to anticipate the nature of future emergencies 
and to determine in advance what means might be necessary to deal with them. As 
a result, the positive law can at best determine who is to decide whether there is 
an emergency that requires a wholesale suspension of the law. But the sovereign 
decision cannot be guided by existing material law. For him, the sovereign is the 
one who decides on the state of emergency. Its authority to suspend the law does 
not stand in need of positive legal recognition, since the law's applicability itself 
depends on a situation of normality secured by the sovereign. We understand that 
to declare the state of emergency in a situation of abnormality is a sovereign 
prerogative of the authorities and they are legitimate by the positive law itself. 
 
For Agamben, the sovereign exception gives rise to the juridical order. ‘The 
rule, suspending itself, gives rise to the exception’ – that is, the juridical order, 
suspending its own validity, produces the exception of bare life – ‘and, 
maintaining itself in relation to the exception, first constitutes itself as a rule’33 
                                                
31 SCHMITT Carl, Political Theology. Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty 
(1922), trans. by G. Schwab, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005. 
32 AGAMBEN Giorgio, The State of exception, University of Chicago Press, 2005 
33 AGAMBEN Giorgio, 1998. Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life. Translated 
by D. Heller-Roazen. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press 
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The state of exception is the recognition of law’s outside but it simultaneously 
suggest sovereign attempts to include that very outside within the law34. 
 
The first decade of the new millennium can be understood as a security decade 
where the war against terrorism is one of the main priority. That’s why the notion 
of the state of emergency change as well. 
 
In a more contemporary perspective we have the theory of Ackerman, for him 
the legitimacy of the state of emergency is based on the social and political effects 
of terrorists attacks. The basis of his concept lies within what he calls the 
“reassurance function”. In times of panic and disorder the way to avoid slow 
dissolution of public order and society the government should dispose strong 
instruments to restore confidence in public authority quickly. In Ackerman’s 
words : “ The best way for government to respond to these fears is to do 
something large and dramatic to reassure the populace that the breach of 
sovereignty was only temporary and that the state is taking every plausible step to 
prevent a second strike”.35 Ackerman mainly proposes a system of concentration 
of power but the necessity of checks and balances to control the state of 
emergency.  
 
According to the theory of Depenheur in front of terrorist threats we 
discovered a new legitimacy for emergency measures36. For him, the Islamic 
terrorists have left the ground of legality and are out of the social contract. The 
“war on terror” takes place within a functioning society and is extraterritorial. 
Consequently, it leads to a parallelism of normality and exception. He sees the 
exceptional conditions a way to enable the state to react immediately. In front of 
this new “hidden threat”, the State of emergency does not to be declared but shall 
be inherent in the constitutional order.37 For him, the enemy has decided freely to 
                                                
34 AGAMBEN Giorgio, The State of exception, University of Chicago Press, 2005 
35 ACKERMAN Bruce, The Emergency Constitution, Yale Law School Legal 
Scholarship Repository, 2004 
36 DEPENHEUR Otto , Selbstbehauptung des Rechtsstaats, Schoningh, 2007 
37 DEPENHEUR Otto , idem,  61-65 
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stand beyond the law,  so there is no reason why a state ruled by law should owe 
the benefits of the rule of law for people whose goal is the annihilation of this 
system. We understand that for him a terrorist cannot be a subject of fundamental 
rights or a legal subject because of the goal that is pursuing. But he recognizes 
that this model can represent dilemma to a democratic state between more legal 
guarantees or more security. It will have a permanent struggle fight of life and 
death which can only be won if the state gives up some of its special guarantees. 
 
We can notice that Ackerman and Depenheur have the same conception of the 
state of emergency whose purpose is to restore public order after terrorist attacks 
and protect society further attacks but that could be only achieved on an empirical 
perspective of the origin of the danger. But on that las point they propose two 
different theories. For Depenheur, as terrorism pursue the destruction of the 
system, the democratic state in a permanent struggle of life and death has to gives 
up some of its special guarantees in order to prevent the destruction of its 
foundations. For Ackerman, even a major terrorist attack cannot to the collapse of 
the state. For that reason, the state of emergency should only serve to reassure the 
trust and the confidence of the people of its government in order to avoid the slow 
erosion of society which would allow authoritarian tendencies to gain in strength 
and finally take over.  
 
In my perspective, the actual terrorism suffered in western countries has not de-
stabilized the democratic system and cause a loss of confidence in the government 
sufficient to justify a need of the elaboration of emergency constitution for 
preventing and fighting terrorist attacks.   
 
 According to the risk based theory of Beck38, global risks are producing 
‘failed states’ who lead to “failed constitutions” . In a world risk society, Beck 
distinguish between ecological and financial dangers, which can be 
conceptualized as side effects, and the threat from terrorist networks as intentional 
                                                
38 BECK Ulrich, « Living in the world risk society », Economy and Society , Volume 35 
Number 3, Routledge,  August 2006 
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catastrophes; the principle of deliberately exploiting the vulnerability of modern 
civil society replaces the principle of chance and accident. Beck is using in his 
theory of risks, all the elements justifying the adoption of exceptional measures. 
According to him, uncertainty , insecurity and lack of safety undermine and 
reaffirm state power beyond democratic legitimacy. The state structure evolving 
under the conditions of world risk society could be characterized in terms of both 
inefficiency and post-democratic authority, authoritarian state regimes. 
  
2.2. Elements of the State of emergency in the European Convention on 
Human Rights 
 
The State of emergency could be defined as an instrument which can be used 
against an enemy whose goal is the destruction of the democratic system, as its 
concept is to deal with extreme situations. 
When a state of exception is put into force, the balance of the relationship among 
individual rights and freedoms and the authority of State organs or administrative 
agents is altered and human rights, as a consequence come under pressure. 
Moreover, the balance in the relationship between state organs is significantly 
changed and executive organs gain more power.  
 
Article 15 of the European Convention on Human rights (ECHR)39, adopted in 
1950,40 allows states to derogate some rights and freedoms of the Convention: 
 
 “ In time of war or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation any 
High Contracting Party may take measures derogating from its obligations under 
this Convention to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation, 
provided that such measures are not inconsistent with its other obligations under 
international law.”  
 
                                                
39 COE (Council of Europe), European Convention on Human Rights, Rome, 
1950  
40 Idem, art 15.  
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In such a way, the emergency must be of a particular magnitude to justify 
derogation. In addition, the state is bound by the principle of proportionality in 
that the measures taken must be “strictly required by the exigencies of the 
situation”. Article 15 is a derogation clause. It affords to Contracting States, in 
exceptional circumstances, the possibility of derogating, in a limited and 
supervised manner, from their obligations to secure certain rights and freedoms 
under the Convention. The text of Article 15 inspired the article 4 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)41 which give some 
provision on the state of emergency at the international level. Article 15 is divided 
in 3 parts: 
 
• Article 15 § 1 defines the circumstances in which Contracting States can 
validly derogate from their obligations under the Convention. It also 
limits the measures they may take in the course of any derogation 
• Article 15 § 2 protects certain fundamental rights in the Convention from 
any derogation 
•  Article 15 § 3 sets out the procedural requirements that any State making 
a derogation must follow. 
 
The first paragraph of the article 15 list 3 conditions for a valid derogation:  
 
• it must be in time of war or other public emergency threatening the life of 
the nation; 
• the measures taken in response to that war or public emergency must not 
go beyond the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation; 
and 
• the measures must not be inconsistent with the State’s other obligations 
under international law. 
 
                                                
41 UN, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted on the 16th of 
December of 1966 
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To interpret the meaning of the first condition, the Court assume that It refers to 
“an exceptional situation of crisis or emergency which affects the whole 
population and constitutes a threat to the organized life of the community of 
which the State is composed” according to an important case in this topic, 
Lawless vs Ireland.42 The emergency should be actual or imminent. At the 
geographical level, a crisis which concerns only a particular region of the State 
can amount to a public emergency if It threatens “the life of the nation”. The crisis 
or danger has to be exceptional in that the normal measures permitted by the 
Convention for the maintenance of public safety, health and order are plainly 
inadequate.43 
 
When the Strasbourg Court examines the designation issue, was there an 
emergency situation? Under Article 15 it affords a wide margin of appreciation to 
the assessment by the national authorities subject to a European supervision. The 
national authorities are in a good position to decide on the presence of such 
emergency and on the nature and scope of derogations necessary to avert it. 
According to the famous case of Lawless vs Ireland, terrorism in Northern Ireland 
met the standard of a public emergency, since for a number of years it represented 
a “particularly far-reaching and acute danger for the territorial integrity of the 
United Kingdom, the institutions of the six counties of Northern Ireland and the 
lives of the province’s inhabitants”44. However, this general approach of 
deference towards the national authorities’ assessment, it is not unlimited: for 
instance, in the “Greek case” the case brought against Greece in response to the 
coup in 1967, the Commission found that, on the evidence before it, there was no 
public emergency which justified the derogation made (Denmark, Norway, 
Sweden and the Netherlands vs Greece )45. 
 
                                                
42 Lawless vs Ireland, ECHR, Application no 332/57, 1 July 1961, para. 28 
43 Denmark, Norway, Sweden and the Netherlands vs Greece, nos. 3321/67, 5 November 
1969 
44 Ireland v. United Kingdom, paras 205 and 212, 18 January 1978 A and others v. 
United Kingdom, para. 176., no. 3455/05, ECHR 2009 
45 Denmark, Norway, Sweden and the Netherlands vs Greece, ECHR, nos. 3321-44/67, 
16th July, 1970 
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About the second condition, the fact that exceptional measures were strictly 
required by the exigencies of the situation. the States do not enjoy an unlimited 
power in this respect. The European Court is charged to rule on whether the States 
have gone beyond what is strictly required by the exigencies of the crisis. To 
determine this situation, the Court will argue on different factors such as the 
nature of the rights affected by the derogation, the circumstances leading to, and 
the duration of the emergency situation, that what it was concluded in the 
Brannigan and Mc Bride vs the United Kingdom 46. 
 
As a third condition, such measures are not inconsistent with other obligations 
under international law. The derogation should be valid under Article 4 of the 
International Convenant on Civil and Political Right. The European Court can 
rely on the observation of the United Nations Human Rights Committee 
(Marshall v. the United Kingdom)47 or on the principles of international 
humanitarian law (Hassan vs the United Kingdom)48. 
 
 
2.3. The non-derogable rights  
 
All rights are universal, indivisible, interdependent and interrelated. While 
international human rights law allows for legitimate limitations, derogations and 
reservations, they must be exercised under strict circumstances. Even in 
exceptional situations, certain core human rights must apply at all times. Those 
core rights are the non-derogable rights, there are protected at the European and 
International level. 
 
 
 
 
                                                
46 Brannigan and Mc Bride vs the United Kingdom, Application no. 14553/89, 26 May 
1993 
47 Marshall vs the United Kingdom , no. 41571/98, 10 July 2001 
48 Hassan vs the United Kingdom [GC], no. 29750/09, ECHR, 16 September 2014 
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2.3.1. Non-derogable rights in European Convention on Human rights  
 
A series of rights are just untouchable, there are situated upon from the national, 
European or international legal order. Those rights have to be protected and 
provided in any circumstances.  
Article 15 paragraph 2 protects certain rights from derogation. It provides that 
there can be no derogation from the right to life (except in respect of deaths 
resulting from lawful acts of war) or from the Article 3 prohibition of torture, 
inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment, the Article 4 prohibition of 
slavery and the principle of the non- retroactivity of the criminal law under Article 
7. 
 
 Three of the additional protocols to the Convention also contain clauses which 
prohibit derogation from certain of the rights contained in them. The prohibition 
of the death penalty (Protocols 6 and 13) and the right not to be tried or punished 
twice for the same offence (Protocol 7) or also called the “ne bis in idem 
principle”.  
The right to life is a fundamental right protected in the ECHR. The convention 
“safeguards the right to life and sets out the circumstances when deprivation of 
life may be justified, ranks as one of the most fundamental provisions in the 
Convention, from which no derogation is permitted”49. In the famous case of  Mc 
Cann and Others v. the United Kingdom which involves the use of lethal force by 
the State it was reminded that the exceptions to the right to life only when it is 
“absolutely necessary”, a term indicating “that a stricter and more compelling test 
of necessity must be employed than that normally applicable when determining 
whether State action is “necessary in a democratic society” under paragraphs 2 of 
Articles 8 and 11 of the Convention”50.  
 
                                                
49 COE, Article 2, European Convention on Human Rights, Rome, 1950 
50 McCann and others v. the United Kingdom, no. 18984/91, 27 of September 1995, para. 
149.  
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The principle of the proportionality for the right to life has to be respected as we 
can see it in the case Wasilewska and Kalucka v. Poland51. The case concerned 
the death of a suspect during an anti-terrorist operation and the observation of the 
violation of Article 2. The Polish Government had failed to submit any comments 
regarding the proportionality of the level of force used by the police, the 
organization of the police action and whether an adequate legislative and 
administrative framework had been put in place to safeguard people against 
arbitrariness and abuse of force52. The effects of the rights of the article 15 § 2 
continue to apply during any time of war or public emergency, irrespective of any 
derogation made by a Contracting State. In the case the Court confirmed that 
these rights were inviolable even in time of conflict. In the context of invasion of 
Iraq, British authorities transferred two Iraqis soldiers accused of involvement in 
the murder of British soldiers in custody. The British authorities were found in 
violation of Article 3 (prohibition of inhuman or degrading treatment) of the 
Convention, concluding that the applicants’ transfer to Iraqi custody had subjected 
them to inhuman treatment. They violated as well article 13,right to an effective 
remedy and Article 34, right to individual petition) of the Convention.53 
 
But there are some exceptions to these exceptions of the right to life, as regards of 
the article 2 which allows the use of force when it is absolutely necessary in the 
circumstances given by the same article. The defense of any person from unlawful 
violence, to effect a lawful arrest or prevent escape of a person lawfully detained, 
action lawfully taken for the purpose of quelling a riot or insurrection or a lawful 
act of war54.  
 
A vital procedural safeguard in also contained in Article 15 para 3 that the 
Secretary General of the Council of Europe shall be kept fully informed of the 
                                                
51 Wasilewska and Kalucka v. Poland no. 28975/04, 23 of February of 2010 
52 ECHR, « Factsheet-Right to life”, Press unit ECHR, June 2013,  
http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/FS_Life_ENG.pdf [Last visited 3 may 2017] 
53 ECHR, « Factssheet about Armed conflicts » , Press unit, February 2017 
http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/FS_Armed_conflicts_ENG.pdf [Last visited 3 may 
2017] 
54 COE, Article 2, European Convention on Human Rights, Rome, 1950 
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measures taken and the reasons therefor and, of course, when the measures cease 
to operate. It is when the derogation becomes public. It is through the Secretary 
General that other Contracting Parties, as well as the Committee of Ministers and 
Parliamentary Assembly Council of Europe, are kept informed when another 
Party lodges a derogation so that other states are kept fully aware of what is 
happening. All of the above-mentioned conditions in Article 15 are reviewable by 
the Strasbourg Court. That breakthrough was what the Court decided in the 
Lawless case. More, the prohibition of no punishment without law, as regards 
Article 7 should always be respected according to the general principles of law 
recognized by civilized nations. 
 
To prevent the attacks to the democratic order and the rule of law, the European 
Court of Human Rights, the Commission has developed the tradition to apply the 
article 17 ECHR, the so- called abuse clause. This article stipulates that “nothing 
in this Convention may be interpreted as implying for any State, group or person 
any right to engage in any activity or perform any act aimed at the destruction of 
any of the rights and freedoms set forth herein or at their limitation to a greater 
extent than is provided for in the Convention.” The first reason for the existence 
of this clause is to give democracy the legal weapons necessary to prevent the 
repeat of history, in particular the atrocities committed in the past by totalitarian 
regimes of national-socialist, fascist or communist persuasion. 
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2.3.2. Non-derogable rights in International Covenant on civil and political rights  
 
From an international law’s perspective, article 4 of the International Covenant on 
civil and political rights (ICCPR) afford states parties the possibility of derogating 
from most obligations in times of public emergency threatening the life of the 
nation to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation, provided 
that such measures are not inconsistent with other obligations under international 
law. It implicitly includes a requirement of necessity and proportionality. 
According to Article 4.2 of the ICCPR, no derogation is permitted from, inter alia 
: 
• the right to life (Article 6) 
• freedom from cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment 
(Article 7) 
•  freedom from slavery and servitude (Article 8.1 and .2) 
•  prohibition of debtor’s prison (Article 11) 
•  non–retroactivity of the law (Article 15) 
•  the right to be recognized as a person before the law (Article 16) 
• and the freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief (Art. 18) 
The list of non-derogable rights of the ICCPR is longer than the ECHR one.  
 
On the non-derogable right to life, Depenheur work55 deals with the right to 
life under emergency conditions , not the right to life for suspected terrorists, but 
the right to life for civilians who lose their lives as a consequence of anti-terror 
measures. That the example of airplane hijacked by terrorists heading for a 
skyscraper with no chance for the passenger to regain control over the plane with 
the only chance to avoid the collision to shoot the plane down before the colliding 
skyscraper. In 2006, the German Constitutional Court revoked the air security act 
which had given the permission to shoot down a plan under these circumstances. 
The Court56 held that such measure was not compatible with the fundamental 
                                                
55 DEPENHEUR Otto , Selbstbehauptung des Rechtsstaats, Schoningh, 2007 
56 BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHT, no. 357/05, February 15th , 2006 
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guarantee of human dignity in conjunction with the right to life of the German 
Basic Law.  
 
2.4. Effects of the State of Emergency  
 
Acts of terrorism are undoubtedly a formidable challenge. They put citizens and 
political leaders into a state of fear. This fear is especially powerful because the 
perpetrators are not visible, because there is no state of war because what is being 
sought is far beyond disputes over territory or interests. For democratic regimes, 
the challenge is especially difficult because they must oppose terrorism and not 
losing sight of the reasons why a democracy exists. In contrast with the aims of 
acts of terrorism, the challenge for democracies is not to fear their opponents nor 
to destroy them, but rather to maintain security and preserve their values.57 
 
A study called “The Determinants of Emergency Constitutions” realized by 
Christian Bjornskov and Stefan Voigt58, two professors at the University of 
Munich aimed to know which factors cause the inclusion of particular emergency 
provisions into constitutions. They give us a really interesting perspective because 
It is comparative study which show the differences between the emergency 
constitutions and their provisions. They introduce an Indicator of Emergency 
Provisions which represents both the benefits and the inconvenients of a state of 
emergency. The INEP takes into account six dimensions, namely (1) the degree to 
which the right to declare a state of emergency is concentrated in a single person – 
or very few – or limited by multiple veto players; (2) the need to get the 
emergency approved by other players; (3) how many different situations are 
explicitly mentioned in the constitution and can be used to justify the declaration 
of a state of emergency; (4) whether fundamental civil and political rights can be 
suspended during a state of emergency; (5) whether parliament can be dissolved 
                                                
57 INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION FOR HUMAN RIGHTS ,When the exception 
becomes the norm, Counter-terrorism measures & human rights, France International 
fact-finding mission report, International Federation for Human Rights, June 2016 
58 BJORNSKOV Christian and VOIGT Stefan, The Determinants of Emergency 
Constitutions, University of Hamburg, Institute of Law and Economics, March 23 of 
2016 
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during a state of emergency; and (6) whether the government can introduce 
censorship of the media and expropriate property during an emergency.  
 
They could observed that conversely, constitutions implemented after the collapse 
of communism clearly tend to be less likely to allow expropriation and censorship 
and include more conditions under which a state of emergency can be declared. 
Royal dictatorships have the strongest declaration rights while presidential 
democracies tend to include the most conditions that allow for declaring a state of 
emergency. Historically, mixed democracies have been less prone to allow 
suspension of rights, expropriation and censorship, but at present, all types of 
democracies now appear similar on average. 
 
About the motives included in the Constitution to declare the State of Emergency 
according to this study. These motives are provided or are inspired by some 
provisions of the constitution.  
 
The “benevolent” motives for purely pragmatic reasons. as to save lives after a 
natural disaster, the respective constitutional provisions should contain 
mechanisms against their misuse. It should further exclude the possibility that 
government can “create” the precondition for calling a state of emergency which 
could then be used for political reasons. 
 
The second motive assumes politicians to be power-maximizers and observes that 
ample emergency powers might help politicians to stabilize or even extend their 
actual power. 
 
The third motive is based on the insight that regime transitions often presuppose 
the capacity of the bargaining partners who negotiate constitutional change to 
credibly commit themselves to their promises. 
 
In many cases, once the state of emergency is declared by the authorities it is 
ruled by emergency laws. The real problematic here in our study of state of 
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emergency in a democratic state, is to identify of we should rule by law something 
which is outside the scope of the law. If we follow the Depenheur theory we 
shouldn’t apply the law for someone who commit an abuse of law which lead to 
the state of emergency, the state of emergency is outside the application of legal 
provision. However, this is contrary to supremacy of fundamental Rights provided 
in Constitution. Those emergency laws are here to bring more precision on the 
application of the emergency according to the constitutional provisions. So there 
are totally submitted to the Constitution and should respect it. The state of 
emergency is not outside the constitutional order because it is set by the 
Constitution itself.  
 
As we saw it, for Schmitt, the decision on exception is above the normative 
framework in that it consists in the temporary suspension of the legal constraints 
on sovereignty, but that at the same time the exception is what defines the 
condition of possibility for the law to exist. In Jef Huysmans’ words, “the norm 
does not define the exception but the exception defines the norm”.59We can 
deduce that in his conception, the declaration of the state of emergency is outside 
the legal system and represent a sovereign decision.  
 
For Agamben, who propose a more contemporary reading of the state of 
emergency, the state of exception is coterminous with the law, since it defines the 
borders of the normative order. According to Agamben, “the state of exception is 
neither external nor internal to the juridical order, and the problem of defining it 
concerns precisely a threshold, or a zone of indifference, where inside and outside 
do not exclude each other but rather blur with each other”60. The state of 
exception is about a distinction, since it legitimizes itself in reference with an 
external threat which has to be dealt with through exceptional measures, and at 
the same time it strengthens national identity by depicting the enemy as inhuman, 
                                                
59 HUYSMANS Jef, “The Jargon of Exception – On Schmitt, Agamben and the Absence 
of Political Society”, International Political Sociology, Vol. 2, No 2, 2008 
60 HUMPHREYS Stephen, Legalizing Lawlessness: On Giorgio Agamben’s State of 
Exception, University of Chicago Press, 2005 
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and thus unworthy of being treated as other than “bare life”. According to this 
conception the measure of state of emergency is legitimized but It institutionalizes 
fear of the enemy as the constitutive principle for society. That is precisely what 
happened in the detention camp at Guantanamo Bay, or at the Abu Ghraib prison 
in Iraq, where prisoners were denied both the rights to be put on trial according to 
the status of prisoners of war as stated by the Geneva Convention.  
 
To conclude, a lot of factors have to be taking into account to justify the legality 
of the state of emergency. The emergency provisions are regulated by the 
Constitution itself, but in time of emergency, the necessity will create its own law. 
That’s why for some theorists or States, this external threat can justify the non-
application of basic human rights for the enemy of the nation. I don’t really agree 
on that point of view because It weakens the protection for human rights by 
creating exceptions and can generate a lot of abuses.  
 
3. ANALISIS OF EMERGENCY PROVISIONS IN SPANISH, FRENCH 
AND TURKISH CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM  
 
I decided to study 3 cases of legal provisions and practice of the measure of the 
“State of emergency”. We will the examine the case of Spain, France and Turkey. 
In this 3 contemporary examples we will see that even if It looks to present a 
similar approach of the term of legal and constitutional concept of State of 
emergency, in practice the 3 cases don’t provide the same legal control, guarantee 
for the people and affectation on human rights.  
 
3.1.  Spain and the evolutive regimes of exception  
 
The article 116 of the Spanish Constitution determine 3 different exceptional 
regimes:  
• state of alarm (estado de alarma)  
• state of emergency (estado de excepción)  
• state of siege (estado de sitio) 
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According to article 116 of Spanish Constitution, it’s necessary a legal 
development of this constitutional provision: “An organic act shall make 
provision for the states of alarm, emergency and siege (martial law) and the 
powers and restrictions attached to each of them.”61 
 
The state of alarm62 has to be declared by the Government through decree issued 
by Council of Ministers. The Parliament (Congreso de los diputados) just has to 
be informed of the adoption of this measure, gathered immediately. The state of 
emergency cannot last more than 15 days but It can be extended with the 
authorization of the Parliament. The decree will define the territorial scope where 
the state of emergency will be applied.   
 
The state of exception will be declared by the Government through decree issued 
by Council of Ministers with the previous authorization of the Parliament. The 
authorization must specifically state the effects, the rights which can be 
suspended, the territory to which it is to apply and its duration, which may not 
exceed thirty days, subject to extension for a further thirty-day period, with the 
same requirements.63We can observe a major review of the Parliament, because 
this measure is more restrictive in rights than the state of alarm. 
The state of siege will be declared with the absolute majority of the Parliament 
after the proposal of the Government. The Parliament will be the one to define the 
territorial scope of this measure, the duration and its conditions64.  
 
The Congress may not be dissolved while any of the states referred to in the pre- 
sent section remains in force. Proclamation of states of alarm, emergency and 
siege shall not affect the principle of liability of the Government or its agents as 
recognized in the Constitution and the laws65. 
 
                                                
61 Constitución Española de 1978, BOE núm. 311, de 29 de diciembre de 1978, article 
116.1 
62 Idem, Article 116.2. 
63 idem, Article 116.3 
64 idem, Article 116.4 
65 idem, Article 116.6 
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The legal provision of these regimes are also developed through the Law of 1st of 
June of 1981.66According to the this law the states of alarm, exception and siege 
“when extraordinary circumstances made it impossible to maintain a normal 
situation through the ordinary powers of the competent authorities”67. 
 
The state of alarm can be activated “in all or part of the national territory” when 
there are “catastrophes, calamities, public misfortunes such as earthquakes, 
floods, forest or urban fires or large-scale accidents” as well as to face health 
crises, situations of shortage or stoppage of public services68. 
 
A state of emergency can be activated “when the free exercise of rights and 
freedoms of citizens, the normal functioning of democratic institutions, the public 
services essential to the community, or any other aspect of public order should be 
so seriously altered that the ordinary exercise of powers is insufficient to maintain 
it”.69 
 
The declaration of a state of siege can be carried out when “an insurrection or act 
of force occurs or threatens the sovereignty or independence of Spain, its 
territorial integrity or the constitutional order, and the situation cannot be restored 
by other means”. In this case, the government “will designate the military 
authority” that “under its leadership will have to execute the measures that must 
be carried out in the territory the state of siege applies to”70. 
 
Since then, Spain only declare the state of emergency once during the strike of air 
traffic controllers which paralyzed the Spanish air space or a few days in 
December 201071. An emergency Royal Decree was signed ordering the Ministry 
of Defence to take control of Spain’s air space and move all the military into all 
                                                
66 Law on the state of alarm, emergency and siege, BOE, no. 134, 1st of June of 1981 
67 Article 1, Law on the state of alarm, emergency and siege, BOE, no. 134, 1981 
68 idem, Article 4  
69 idem, Article 13 
70 idem, Article 32 
71 OWEN Edward, Spain to declare State of Alert over air traffic control strikes, The 
Telegraph, December 2010  
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control centers and control towers in Spain. It was the first time a State of Alert 
has been declared under the 1978 Constitution It allows the authorities to take 
over in cases of major disasters or the paralyzation of public services. Air traffic 
controllers refused to carry out minimum service and refused to work under 
military. AENA said that since the sudden walkout started, 1,686 of 5,032 flights 
scheduled for Friday in Spain had been cancelled affecting 330,000 passengers. 
 
The particularity of the Spanish legal system is that It is progressive. So 
depending the political situation and the threats that the State has to face, a 
different exceptional regime will be adopted. More the integrity of the Spanish 
territory is threatening, more the parliamentary review will be needed and more 
rights could be suspended, according to article 55 of Spanish Constitution. 
 
But compared to France and Turkey, the two others examples that we are going to 
develop, Spain never derogate from its obligations of the European Convention on 
Human rights.  
 
3.2.  France, when the exception becomes the norm 
 
To see the example of France is interesting because It is known of one of the 
democracy most respectful of the human rights. Its constitution and its legislation 
are very complete to regulate the State of emergency. In the last years , the 
country has been affected by the threat against terrorism, an the state of 
emergency have been used to face these issues.  
 
Over the course of this decade, France has been the scene of numerous acts of 
terrorism:  
• In march 2012, 7 people were killed in a Jewish school in Toulouse  
• On the 7th of January 2015 the attacks at the offices of the newspaper 
Charlie Hebdo  
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• The evens of 13 of November 2015 that led to the declaration of a state of 
emergency after the shooting attacks simultaneously in Stade de France 
and in the concert hall Le Bataclan where 130 died.  
The French President declared a state of emergency applicable to the entire 
country on the night of the 13 November attacks. On 20 November 2015, the 
French Parliament voted by an overwhelming majority to extend the state of 
emergency for a period of three months. On 16 February 2016, a second extension 
was approved. On 20 April, the government announced its intention to ask 
Parliament to vote on a new law authorizing the extension of the state of 
emergency by an additional two months; the law was adopted by the Senate on 10 
May and by the National Assembly on 26 May72. 
 
Historically, the Law of 3 April 195573 on state of emergency, adopted to deal 
with the situation in Algeria, had been applied on seven occasions before the 
attacks on 13 November 2015. On 20 November 2015, the French Parliament 
approved Law no. 2015-150174, prolonging the application of the Law of 3 April 
1955 on state of emergency and reinforcing the effect of its provisions. 
The text extended the scope of measures applicable in a state of emergency  
• it allowed the three-month extension 
• It sets out the conditions in which individuals can be placed under house 
arrest, it there are “serious reasons to believe that their behavior represents 
a threat to public safety and order”75 
• the possibility of seizing computer files during searches, even in a 
person’s home, both during daytime and at night76 
• the possibility to prohibit organized public demonstrations “of a nature 
which may provoke or sustain disorder”.77 
                                                
72 INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, When the exception 
becomes the norm, Counter-terrorism measures & human rights, France International 
fact-finding mission report, International Federation for Human Rights, June 2016 
73 Law on the State of Emergency, no. 55-385 of the 3rd of April of 1955 
74 Law on the State of Emergency, no. 2015-1501 of the 20th of 2015 
75Idem, Article 6: house arrest 
76Idem, Article 11: searches and seizures of computer files 
77Idem, Article 8 : bans on public demonstrations 
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• it allowed the Council of Ministers to dissolve by decree any associations 
and de facto assemblies that “participate in the commission of acts that can 
seriously disturb public order or whose activities facilitate or incite 
commission of such acts”.78 
The actual and potential threat to human rights is real in the case of exceptional 
regimes and this necessitates, particularly judicial, but also political control, both 
at the national and supranational level, on the practices of power. The French 
legal system, provides a parliamentary control in order to prevent to excesses of 
the measures under the state of emergency.  
 
According to the article 4.1 of the Law of 1955, it stipulates that the National 
Assembly and the Senate “shall be informed without delay of the measures taken 
by the government during the state of emergency. They can request any additional 
information for the purposes of oversight and evaluation of these measures.”79 
This type of parliamentary oversight, however, does not include the ability to 
impose 
restrictions or sanctions. By creating a posteriori controls that are exclusively in 
the hands of administrative court judges, ordinary court judges have been 
dispossessed of the ability to exercise any control over the measures taken, in 
complete disregard of Article 66 of the French Constitution, which provides: “The 
Judiciary, guardian of individual liberty, shall ensure this principle is respected in 
legislation”. The administrative courts have exclusive oversight of measures 
implemented under the state of emergency gives rise to many problems of 
principle. 
 
About the consequences of state of emergency measures, we can conclude from 
that, the application of the state of emergency, in terms of the measures 
implemented under it, confers near total impunity upon agents of the State. Many 
of the state of emergency measures, and searches in particular, were used for 
reasons other than counter-terrorism. However, it became evident that legislation 
                                                
78Idem, Article 6-1: dissolution of associations and assemblies 
79 Article 4.1 of the Law of 1955, revised by the Law of 20 November 2015 
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already in effect was sufficient and that a new law was superfluous. In fact, all of 
the state of emergency measures could already have been implemented under the 
supervision of ordinary courts. Clearly, the purpose of this law is the mass 
collection of information that intelligence agencies must then sort through. No 
tangible effects on the fight against terrorism have been observed, we can easily 
doubt of the effectiveness of the State of emergency.  
 
The problem of the implementation of the State of emergency measures is that 
there were implemented without due consideration of the effects on individual 
freedom and social cohesion. The problem now is that the exception look to be the 
norm. France does not know how to quit its state of emergency even though it has 
become clear that maintaining it erodes the rule of law and fosters human rights 
abuses while not keeping the country safer.80 It is mainly due to confusion by 
politicians about the purpose of a state of emergency. Many have said that it is 
justified by an ongoing terrorist risk. Under this reasoning, a state of emergency is 
needed as long as there is a high security risk. This reasoning is dangerous on 
many levels. By suggesting that regular laws, procedures, and oversight 
mechanisms are not sufficient to counter threats, it weakens the premise of the 
rule of law and relegates it to a luxury for “normal” times. But as the risk of future 
terrorist attacks cannot be predicted, there is a permanent risk for security, should 
it justify a permanent state of emergency?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
80 HOURY Nadim, Breaking France’s Addiction to its State of Emergency, Human 
Rights Watch in Open Democracy, March 2017, 
https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/03/13/breaking-frances-addiction-its-state-emergency 
[Last visited on the 3rd of May 2017] 
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3.3.  Turkey: emergency provisions and fundamental rights 
 
During the last thirty years Turkey has been faced with three coups d'etat: on May 
27, 1960, March 12,1971, September 12, 1980.81 The existence and practice of the 
states of exception in the case of Turkey is required to categorize as «de facto» 
exceptional regimes. This is a misleading use of the same concept of “state of 
exception”, terminology and institutions, which are in essence completely 
different from each other. Even though human rights violations also occur under 
democratic states of exceptions, victims may make use of legal instruments 
against arbitrary and illegal use of power. But in the de facto case, victims do not 
have any legal guarantees, because that situation has been established by the 
overthrow of the democratic system and the seizure of political power in an 
unconstitutional and illegitimate way. According to the Turkish legal system, 
states of exceptions have four categories:  
• a state of emergency, 
• a state of siege 
• a state of military mobilization 
•  a state of war. 
 
3.3.1. The constitutional provisions of the emergency measures  
 
 The scope and effects of these regimes are different. As a rule, state of 
emergency is a type of exceptional regime which is the result of a crisis in the 
existing politico-juridical system that leads to the adoption of emergency 
measures to tackle this crisis. It is also be important to remember that, just 
considering the State of Emergency Law in addition to the Constitution itself, may 
not be sufficient enough to examine state of emergency in Turkey. Very important 
decrees having force of law related to this field were issued by the Council of 
Ministers. These decrees having force of law amended the content and dimensions 
of state of emergency and spread a serious doubt with regard to legality and 
constitutionality even within the framework of the existing regime. According to 
                                                
81 GEMALMAZ Mehmet Semih, State of emergency rule in the Turkish legal 
system: perspectives and texts, Faculty of Law, Istanbul, 2016 
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the 1982 Constitution, the state of emergency can be declared in the event of 
natural disaster, dangerous epidemic diseases and serious economic crisis82. The 
second set of conditions encompass of the emergence of serious indications of 
widespread acts of violence aimed at the destruction of the free democratic order 
established by the Constitution or of fundamental rights and freedoms, or the 
serious deterioration of public order through acts of violence83.  
 
3.3.2. Parallel with European and international emergency provisions 
 
The article 12184 of the Constitution is on the rules and procedures relating to the 
state of emergency. And the State of Emergency Law (SEL) contains detailed 
rules on the application of this regime.85 It is also important to mention the article 
15 of the 1982 Constitution which is relevant to understand the state of emergency 
regime. It regulates the suspension of the exercise of fundamental rights and 
freedoms. According to this provision, the state of emergency regime, as parallel 
as the other types of exceptional regimes, have an effect on rights and freedoms. 
Here, there is a «suspension» of the application of human rights or a “derogation” 
of the guarantees embodied in the Constitution.  
According to this article “In times of war, mobilization, martial law, or a state of 
emergency, the exercise of fundamental rights and freedoms may be partially or 
entirely suspended, or measures derogating the guarantees embodied in the 
Constitution may be taken to the extent required by the exigencies of the situation, 
as long as obligations under international law are not violated. Even under the 
circumstances indicated in the first paragraph, the individual’s right to life, the 
integrity of his/her corporeal and spiritual existence shall be inviolable except 
where death occurs through acts in conformity with law of war […]”.  
This article provides a list of non-derogable rights, there are right to life, the 
inviolability of the in f the integrity of an individual’s material and spiritual 
                                                
82 Article 119, Constitution of Republic of Turkey adopted on the 18, October 1982 
83 Idem, Article 120  
84 Idem, Article 121  
85 State of Emergency Act, number 2935, Published in the Official Gazette on 27 October 
1983 
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entity, the freedom of conscience, religion and opinion, the non-retroactivity of 
penalties, the principle of innocence.  
 
We can recognize here the conformity of the Turkish Constitution with the 
European Convention on Human Rights with the same non derogable rights in 
times of emergency (right to life), but in a larger and more flexible perspective. 
When we compare it with the “derogation clauses” of the supranational human 
rights instruments (ECHR, ICCPR, ACHR)86, the article 15 generally interpreted 
and applied in a way that, it allows the derogation from : 
• the substance of fundamental rights 
• the exercise of these rights 
• the guarantees of human rights which are in fact, essential in order to 
protect them. 
 
That’s why this suspension opens the door, by deleting constitutional guarantees 
recognized for individual, to the unsecure regime. More, Turkey's governmental 
traditional policy with regard to the supranational human rights instruments may 
be characterized by an «unwillingness» to be bound with international law 
obligations.  
 
3.3.3. State of emergency in Turkey and lack of judicial review  
 
At the judicial level, the practice of the ordinary and higher courts of Turkey there 
has been also a general unwillingness to apply the provisions of human rights 
treaties.87 The President of the Republic provides that, the President is entitled “to 
proclaim martial law or state of emergency, and to issue decree having force of 
law, in accordance with the decisions of the Council of Ministers under his 
                                                
86 COE, Article 15 of the European Convention on Human rights, op.cit. 1953;  
Article 4 of the International Covenant on civil and Political rights, op.cit. 1966; 
Article 27 of the American Convention on Human Rights, op.cit. 1969 
87 Constitutional Court of Turkey Judgement 1 of July of 1963, No: 1963/207, 1963/175, 
The Court found that the death penalty was not unconstitutional, by referring to the 
ECHR.  
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chairmanship” according to the article 104 of the Constitution.88About the 
procedures and rules everything is regulated in the constitution89:  
• the decision on the declaration shall be published in the Official Gazette 
• this decision shall be submitted immediately to the Turkish Grand 
National Assembly for approval 
• the National Assembly is entitled to 
a) alter the duration of the state of emergency 
b) extend the period for a maximum of four months each time at 
the request of the Council of Ministers 
c) lift the state of emergency 
• during the state of emergency, the Council of Ministers meeting under the 
chairmanship of the President of the Republic, may issue decrees having 
force of law 
• the subject of these decrees having force of law is limited by the matters 
necessitated by the state of emergency 
• these decrees shall be published in the Official Gazette and shall be 
submitted to the National Assembly on the same day for approval. 
 
The judicial review of a state of exception is known another fundamental 
problematic subject that needs to be examined. This control should be exercised at 
3 levels, ordinary courts, the Constitutional court and the supranational human 
rights organs' judicial. But the Turkish Constitution fails to provide any effective 
oversight mechanism to ensure that limits on derogations from human rights.  
In practice, we can make parallel with the very recent events happened in Turkey, 
in order to compare the practice of the State of emergency with this legal and 
theoretical approach.  
 
 
 
                                                
88 Article 104 of the Constitution of Republic of Turkey adopted on the 18, October 1982 
89 Idem, Article 121  
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3.3.4. The effects of the state of emergency on human rights  
 
An attempted coup in July 2016 allowed the Council of Minister to declare a state 
of emergency in Turkey, which has been extended for the period between October 
19, 2016, January 19, 2017 and April 19, 2017 .90After that, the Council of 
Ministers issued several emergency decrees with the force of law (Kanun 
Hükmünde Kararname), granting unlimited discretionary powers to the executive 
and administrative authorities. Turkey also notified the Council of Europe and the 
United Nations of its intentions to derogate from certain obligations under the 
European Convention on Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights.  
 
A number of measures taken after the declaration of the state of emergency raise 
very serious concerns under Turkish constitutional law and international human 
rights law, despite the fact that Turkey has chosen to derogate from a number of 
its obligations. In many cases, the proportionality of the measures taken to the 
scale and extent of the public emergency, and the necessity of the measures taken, 
is questionable, as recently iterated by the Human Rights Commissioner of the 
Council of Europe91.  
 
The decrees adopted pursuant to the State of emergency have far-reaching 
consequences for human rights. One of the most contentious measures concerns 
the extension of police powers to detain suspects for up to thirty days without 
judicial review.92 The same decree also allow for the review of detention, 
objection to detention, and requests for release to be conducted solely on the basis 
of the case file, which cannot be reconciled with the principle of habeas corpus, 
                                                
90 BAGLAYAN Basak, The Turkish State of emergency Under Turkish Constitutional 
Law and International Human Rights Law, American Society of International Law 
January 03, 2017, https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/21/issue/1/turkish-state-
emergency-under-turkish-constitutional-law-and#_edn1   [Last visited 5 May 2017] 
91 COE COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, Statement of the Council of 
Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, implications of the Measures Taken Under the 
State of Emergency in Turkey ,(October 7, 2016), 
http://www.coe.int/ru/web/commissioner/-/situation-in-turkey; [Last visited 5 May 2017] 
92 Decree with Force of Law No. 667, article 6.1 a), July 23, 2016 
 
48 
entitling anyone deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention to proceedings 
before a court in order to determine the lawfulness of the detention and 
inconsistent with the right to be considered innocent until proven guilty by a court 
rulling93. The decrees have been applied to, among others, civil society 
organizations, private educational institutions, trade unions, hospitals and clinics, 
the media, as well as business and financial establishments. More than a thousand 
NGOs and trade unions, and more than a hundred media establishments have been 
dissolved and liquidated without judicial proceedings.  
 
Many of Turkey’s actions or decision goes against freedom of expression and 
freedom of association. Turkish police have raided the offices and detained the 
editor and twelve senior staff members of one of Turkey’s oldest, left-leaning 
newspapers, alleging that they had published content that attempted to legitimize 
the coup.94 In addition to opposition press, opposition parties have also been 
targeted. Twelve deputies of the People’s Democratic Party, the third largest party 
in Turkey’s parliament, have been detained for “making propaganda for a terrorist 
organization.”95 Since July 15, between approximately 70,000 and 110,000 civil 
servants have been suspended or dismissed without any investigation or 
possibility of legal challenge. These individuals are banned for life from working 
in the public sector and their titles, ranks, and licenses96. Additionally, those who 
are dismissed are being stigmatized when their names are listed in annexes to the 
decrees, which may constitute interference with their private life and “unlawful 
attacks on their honor and reputation”97. All of these measures are being applied 
with an alarming level of arbitrariness.  
                                                
93 Constitution of Republic of Turkey ,Article 38 , op. cit.  
94 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, « Turkey Detains Editor and Staff at Opposition 
Cumhuriyet Newspaper », The Guardian ,October31, 2016, 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/oct/31/turkey-detains-editor-and-staff-at-
opposition-cumhuriyet-newspaper [Last visited 5 May 2017] 
95 AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL,Amnesty International Press Release, Turkey: HDP 
Deputies Detained Amid Growing Onslaught on Kurdish Opposition Voices ,November. 
4, 2016, http://www.amnestyusa.org/news/press-releases/turkey-hdp-deputies-detained-
amid-growing-onslaught-on-kurdish-opposition-....[Last visited 5 May 2017] 
96 Decree with the Force of Law No. 672, article 2.2, September 1, 2016 
97 Article 20 of the Constitution of Republic of Turkey op. cit.  
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The measures are aimed at those who “belong to, connect to, or contact with” 
alleged terrorist organizations.98  
 
To conclude, it will be for the domestic courts, the Human Rights Committee, and 
the European Court of Human Rights to consider whether the proper balance is 
achieved or whether Turkey has violated its international legal obligations during 
the state of emergency. The situation currently prevailing in Turkey, however, 
suggests that it will be difficult for the authorities to justify the necessity and 
proportionality, and thus the continuation, of the existing measures. The 
international community and human rights organizations denounce the excess of 
the measures under the state of emergency and ask to put an end to the wave of 
political repression. But the future of Turkey looks even darker after the winning 
of the presidential referendum on the April 16, 2017 for a new political system. 
The campaign took place under a state of emergency and in a highly repressive 
climate. This reform will lead to a new division of powers where the President 
will gain an enormous centralized power99. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
98 Decree with the Force of Law No. 668, article 2, art. 2(c), July 27, 2016 
99 HUMAN RGHTS WATCH, Turkey: End State of Emergency after Referendum, 
Human Rights Watch, April 17 of 2017, https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/04/17/turkey-
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CONCLUSION  
 
 
To answer to the question how far the rights protected in the Constitution can be 
suspended when the state integrity is threatening.  
We saw the provisions of emergency measures in the supreme constitution. First 
we reminded how the constitution was identified has the supreme norm of the 
legal system. In a theoretical perspective, the concept of constitution has been 
created as a social contract necessary to build a society able to guarantee the 
protection of the rights of citizens and to organize the repartition of power in the 
State. The constitution as a fundamental is characterized by the principle of 
supremacy. As Kelsen’s vision, the constitution is the basic norm and the top of 
the pyramid norm. The position of the constitution in the legal order and its direct 
applicability has been reaffirmed after the World Wars. The constitution and the 
rights that It contains have to be strictly respected because of the primacy of the 
constitution. The formation of the Constitution is the result of the history, culture 
and international standards which form a series of rights which are no-derogable. 
The supremacy of the constitution is also guaranteed by the constitutional review 
organized by an ad hoc court. The written constitutions protect the principle of 
rule of law. This principle is really important because it sets other basic principles 
as the legal regularity, democracy and individual rights. 
The constitution includes also the emergency provisions. These provisions were 
influenced by international law and resolutions of the security council. Because 
the appearance of terrorism opens a new discourse of a global state of emergency, 
and the need for a permanent war on terror. Then, we understand that the use of 
emergency for global security is not only a national issue but an international 
issue and multi-level issue. But as noticed the CJUE in the Kadi’s case, the states 
need to find a balance between constitutional core values and effective 
international measures against terrorism when they adopt emergency measures.  
Many authors have debated on the notion of state of emergency. But a single legal 
definition cannot be found because the concept of the state of emergency is an 
attempt to legally explain and regulate phenomenon whose main characteristic is 
the deregulation of legally regulated fields. In a contemporary perspective, the 
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purpose of state is to restore public order after attacks, mainly terrorists and 
protect society from further attacks and to reassure the trust and the confidence of 
the people of its government in order to avoid the slow erosion of society.  
The article 15 of European Convention on Human rights defines the 
circumstances in which Contracting States can validly derogate from their 
obligations under the Convention. It must be in time of war or other public 
emergency threatening the life of the nation, the measures taken in response to 
that war or public emergency must not go beyond the extent strictly required by 
the exigencies of the situation.  
It also limits the measures they may take in the course of any derogation. The 
article protects certain fundamental rights in the Convention from any derogation. 
It provides that there can be no derogation from the right to life, the prohibition of 
torture, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment, the prohibition of 
slavery and the principle of the non- retroactivity of the criminal law.  
The International Covenant on civil and political rights set a longer list of non-
derogable rights in times of emergency.  
The article 15 sets out the procedural requirements that any State making a 
derogation must follow. 
We understood that the state of emergency cannot suspend the Constitutions but 
allows governments to suspend some rights protected in the Constitutions. The 
challenge for the authorities is to maintain security and preserve democratic 
values in time of emergency. To measure the effects of the state of emergency we 
can refer to the degree to which the right to declare a state of emergency is 
concentrated in a single person or very few, the need to get the emergency 
approved by other players, how many different situations are explicitly mentioned 
in the constitution and justify the state of emergency, whether fundamental civil 
and political rights can be suspended during a state of emergency, whether 
parliament can be dissolved during a state of emergency; and whether the 
government can introduce censorship of the media and expropriate property 
during an emergency.  
We saw through different constitutional provisions of state of emergency in other 
states.  
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In Spain with a progressive legal system with different exceptions regimes 
according to the circumstances that have to face the State. More the integrity of 
the Spanish territory is threatening, more the parliamentary review will be needed 
and more rights could be suspended.  
In France, with a strong regulation to rule the state of emergency and the 
provision of a political control, both at the national and supranational level, on the 
practices of power. But in a permanent war against a non-concrete threat as 
terrorism, France has to face the challenge to know if it can justify to maintain the 
state of emergency even though it has become clear that it erodes the rule of law 
and fosters human rights abuses while not necessarily keeping the country safer.  
In Turkey, is an example the constitutional provisions of the state of emergency 
and the international guarantee were not able to prevent abuses on human rights 
during the practice of state of emergency. This is due to the lack of judicial review 
of the measures taken during the state of emergency and the measure itself by 
centralizing executive power and allowing derogation to certain rights. Turkey is 
the example that If the principle of necessity and proportionality are not observed 
by the authorities during time of emergency we cross the line upon an 
authoritarian regime.  
To prevent the abuses of the state of emergency measures a strong system of 
protection of rights has to be established. In the context of plurality of systems 
protecting fundamental rights and the rule of law the legal order is converting in a 
multilevel protection of rights. For European democracies, there are a lot of 
different spheres of rights protection, from the role of local and regional 
authorities until the role of the international actors.  
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